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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the effect of the finance-dominated growth regime on aggregate 
demand for the case of the US economy with a particular focus on the changes in primary 
functional income distribution between wage and profit income as well as the secondary 
income distribution between the rentier income and the non-rentier profits. For this 
investigation we use a Post-Kaleckian macro model as a starting point. A second aim is to 
show that the incorporation of the effects of a finance-dominated regime to the Post-
Kaleckian macro models improves our understanding of the effects of distribution on growth.   
The notion of a finance-dominated growth regime covers a wide range of phenomena, 
which are usually referred to as “financialization”.1 In this paper we investigate three 
dimensions of the various effects of the finance dominated regime on the macroeconomy:  i) 
the effects of increased payments to the rentier on investment, i.e. interest and dividend 
payments out of profits, the latter of which also reflects the shareholder value orientation, ii) 
the effects of the increased rentier income on consumption, iii) the effects of the housing and 
financial market bubbles on consumption. 
We use the notion of a ‘finance-dominated’ accumulation regime to highlight that 
financial developments crucially shape the pattern and pace of investment and growth. This 
term is broader than the term finance-led, which is used by Boyer (2000) to define a regime 
where an increase in the financial norm, that is, the hurdle rate set by financial markets for 
investment projects, leads to an increase in growth. Contrarily Stockhammer (2008) defines a 
finance-dominated accumulation regime in such a way that financialization can positively or 
negatively affect growth. In particular, it is possible that the macro economy is not finance-
led, but it is still shaped by changes in the financial sector.2   
The USA is an interesting case to analyze these effects. Financialization is in many 
respects most developed in the USA and it has experienced a consumption led-boom since the 
mid-1990s, as can be seen in the rise of Consumption/GDP in Figure 1. This boom has also 
                                                 
1 E.g. the deregulation of the financial sector and the proliferation of new financial instruments, the liberalization 
of international capital flows and increasing instability in exchange rate markets; overall increase in uncertainty, 
market-based financial systems, the emergence of institutional investors as major players, the boom and bust in 
asset markets, shareholder value orientation and changes in corporate governance, increased access to credit and 
thereby debt by households, or changes in the level of (real) interest rates. Financialization has also been used to 
highlight psychological changes and ideological structures. 
2 Other authors have put forward arguments in a similar spirit for the case of US (Crotty 2003; Duménil & Lévy 
2001; Krippner2005). Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005) use the term ‘finance-led’, an analysis centring on 
shareholder value without implying that the finance-led regime would automatically give rise to high growth. 
Brenner (2003) highlights how a boom turned into a bubble without invoking the notions financialization or 
finance-led growth. 
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corresponded to an increase in the change in income distribution in favour of the profit share 
(gross operating surplus/GDP) as can be seen in Figure 2. Given the basic assumption that the 
marginal propensity to consume out of profits is lower than that out of wages, this is a 
puzzling case. The wealth effects, thus consumption led by financial and housing wealth was 
thought to be significant to explain this development. The second puzzle arises when one 
observes the trend in investment, in particular how much of the profits has been invested. As 
can be seen in Figure 3, since the 1980s, there is a sharp decline in the gross private 
investment/gross operating surplus ratio; the recovery during the stock market boom of the 
late 1990s was once again reversed after the bust of 2001, and the recovery after 2002 did not 
bring about a corresponding increase in the investment/gross operating surplus ratio. This 
puzzle however can be understood, by looking more carefully at how the profit income is 
distributed. Since the 1980s there has been a jump in the share of the rentier income, i.e. net 
interest and dividend payments, as a ratio to total profits (gross operating surplus), as can be 
seen in Figure 4. The increase in rentier income was first due to the increase in interest rates 
in the 1980s, and after the decline of the interest rates in the 1990s, the increase in dividend 
payments helped to hold the rentier share at high levels. As a consequence the non-rentier 
profit income (gross operating surplus-net interest and dividend payments) as a ratio to GDP 
follows a completely different pattern than the profit share in the 1980s as can be seen in 
Figure 5; the fall throughout the 1960s and 70s is not followed by a major recovery during the 
1980s; the slight recovery since the 1990s is again reversed since 2006. Indeed the ratio of 
investment to non-rentier profits has fallen much less than investment/gross operating surplus 
ratio (Figure 6). Still it is interesting to note that this investment ratio has also not achieved 
the peak points of 1979, not even during the second peak in 2000.      
Figure 1-6 
This paper aims at explaining both of these puzzles of the increase in consumption and 
the stagnation in investment during a period of pro-capital redistribution of income in the 
USA. The basic model is inspired by the work of Keynes and Kalecki, and is a version of the 
model presented by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). It is a Post-Kaleckian macro model that 
allows for wage-led as well as for profit-led demand regimes according to the relative size of 
the consumption differential, the sensitivity of investment to profits and the sensitivity of net 
exports to unit labor costs. We extend this basic model by incorporating the effects of the 
finance-dominated regime on aggregate demand. The primary redistribution of income in 
favor of the rentier income as well as the non-rentier profits at the expense of wages is 
expected to suppress consumption; however the secondary redistribution from profits to 
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rentier income is expected to increase consumption due to a higher marginal propensity to 
consume out of rentier income. The wealth effects of housing and financial market bubbles on 
consumption are also expected to lead to an increase in consumption even if the debt 
mechanism is not sustainable in the long run. Regarding investment, a higher rentier income 
is expected to suppress investment through both lower investable funds available to the firm 
and shareholder value orientation.   
Several papers have theoretically modeled the effects of financialization on the 
components of aggregate demand (Boyer, 2000; Lavoie, 1995, 2006, 2008; Lavoie and 
Godley, 2001-2; Godley and Lavoie 2007; Palley, 2006; Hein, 2006, 2007, 2008a, b; van 
Treeck, 2007; Skott and Ryoo, 2008). Hein and van Treeck (2008) present a useful review of 
this existing literature. The theoretical contribution of this paper is to combine the effects of 
primay and secondary income distribution and wealth effects. Furthermore the paper 
contributes to empirical literature on these types of models, which is limited to Hein and 
Ochsen (2003) as of now; van Treeck (2008), Orhangazi (2008), and Stockhammer (2005-6) 
present estimations for investment only. Our contribution regarding the existing empirical 
work is i) the incorporation of wealth effects on consumption, ii) an accurate accounting of 
the effects of rentier income vs. non-rentier profits on investment as well as consumption, iii) 
the analysis of the overall effects in the open economy context, in order to make our results 
comparable to the former estimations of the basic open economy Bhaduri-Marglin model, iv) 
using modern time series techniques, which deal with several econometric problems of the 
existing literature,.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background. 
Section 3 summarizes the empirical literature. Section 4 presents the estimation results. 
Section 5 summarizes the key findings and draws policy conclusions. 
2. Wage-led vs. profit-led demand in a finance-dominated regime 
This section presents the theoretical model that incorporates the effects of the finance-
dominated regime into a basic Post-Keynesian model based on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). 
The basic model is used to analyze the effects of changes in functional income distribution on 
aggregate demand. While in the classical Kaleckian model (for a closed economy) an increase 
in the wage share will always lead to an increase in demand (Kalecki 1954, Blecker 1999), 
this is not necessarily the case in the Bhaduri-Marglin model. Here profit-led as well as wage-
led demand regimes are possible since a positive effect of a pro-capital redistribution on 
investment is allowed for. The question whether the positive effect of wages on consumption 
 4
or the negative effect of profits on investment is larger, becomes an empirical one. In an open 
economy additional negative effects will operate through net exports.  Net exports are a 
negative function of domestic demand, a positive function of foreign demand (Yf), and 
depend negatively on unit labour costs (ULC), which are an indicator of international 
competitiveness. ULC are by definition closely related to the wage share, and oppositely 
related to the profit share. Aggregate demand (Y) is the sum of consumption (C), investment 
(I), net exports (NX) and government expenditure (G). Leaving out the government sector, we 
focus on a basic private open economy model.  
The finance-dominated regime affects macroeconomic activity through its effects on 
households’ consumption behavior as well as investment. Foreign trade is not affected by 
financialization in our model, therefore financialization will only make a difference in terms 
of the demand regime in the closed economy, but the magnitude of the effect of distribution 
on the foreign demand will also eventually determine whether demand is wage-led or profit-
led. Financialization also affects distribution either through its effect on the profit share at the 
expense of the wages (depending on the mark-up power of firms and the degree of conflict 
inflation), or its effect on higher managerial wages, as argued by Hein and van Treeck (2008), 
Lavoie (2006, 2008), Godley and Lavoie (2007), Palley (2006), and Epstein and Jayadev 
(2005). This is certainly an important aspect, but in this paper we take distribution to be 
exogenously determined for simplicity; however to account for possible problems 
econometric that might arise due to the endogeneity of distribution, we use the lag of 
distribution as explanatory variable. In the following we discuss the effects of finance 
dominated regime on consumption and investment.  
2.1 Consumption 
The relevance of income distribution in a Kaleckian consumption function is that the 
propensity to consume out of wages (W), wc , is higher than that out of profits (R), πc .  
RcWccC w π++= 0         (Equation 1) 
0c  is autonomous consumption. R= Y-W is equal to gross operating surplus.  Profit 
share is 
Y
R=π . Rewriting C by substituting R by πY, and W by (1-π)Y and reaaranging the 
terms, we get: 
YccYccC ww ππ )(0 −++=        (Equation 2) 
Since wcc <π , consumption is expected to decrease when the profit share rises. 
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The effect of the finance dominated regime on consumption works through two 
channels: a) the increase in the rentier income share and the higher marginal propensity to 
consume out of rentier income compared to the profit income, b) the financial and housing 
wealth effect   
First, the finance-dominated regime means a redistribution of income in favor of the 
rentier in the form of interest payments and dividends. We define rπ  as the net interest and 
dividend payments as a ratio to GDP, thus the rentier income share, and nrπ is the gross 
operating surplus –(net interest and dividend payments) as a ratio to GDP, thus the non-rentier 
profit share3. Our hypothesis is that the marginal propensity to consume out of rentier income, 
rcπ , is higher than that out of non-rentier profit income, nrcπ . However we still expect that 
wr cc <π .   
The second effect of finance-dominated regime on consumption is the wealth effect. In 
the 1990s there was an increased re-emphasis on the wealth effect in the consumption 
function. This rediscovery was motivated by the economic experience in the USA, where 
private consumption expenditures became the driving force in GDP growth. The falling 
saving rates were thus explained by the rise in the value of financial assets because of the 
stock market boom. It is also found that most of the fall in the savings rate occurred in the top 
income groups, who also benefited most from the increase in financial wealth (Brenner 2003; 
Maki and Palumbo, 2001). In the late 1990s a 5 per cent marginal propensity to consume out 
of financial wealth was often quoted (with some more qualification for European countries; 
e.g. Boone et al. 1998). To the surprise of many economists, the stock market crash in 2000 
did not result in a slowdown in consumption growth. The unabated consumption boom in the 
USA was then explained by booming house prices. Residential property was thus identified as 
the key source of the wealth effect. Several studies claimed to find substantially higher 
marginal propensity to consume out of property wealth than out of financial assets (Case et al 
2001; Catte et al. 2004; Girouard et al. 2006). One of the reasons that housing wealth is 
supposed to drive consumption expenditures is that residential property is more frequently 
accepted as collateral. Booming property prices and a mortgage-fuelled consumption boom, 
however, only cover parts of how financialization may affect consumption behaviour. More 
generally speaking, financialization has given households more access to credit. Access of 
credit, of course, is not restricted to mortgages, but also includes other forms of consumer 
                                                 
3 This includes the retained earnings as well as proprietors’ income, depreciation, and taxes. Thus it is expected 
there is consumption out of proprietor’s income. 
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credit, credit cards and overdraft bank accounts. The mainstream literature assumes that 
households are rational. They increase their debt ratios because their wealth increases. While 
this is probably part of the story, it is also conceivable that a substantial part of the 
accumulated debt is due to households irrationally maintaining consumption levels that are 
unsustainable. Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) and Brown (2008) discuss the role of changing 
social norms in explaining the unprecedented increase in consumption and household debt. As 
wages have stagnated in many countries, but consumption norms as represented in mass 
media have arguably increased, many households have been driven into debt. The potentially 
positive effects of higher wealth on consumption are also taken into account in recent post-
Keynesian theoretical models of Boyer (2000), Lavoie and Godley (2001-2), Skott and Ryoo 
(2008), and van Treeck (2007). 
Disaggregating π as rπ  and nrπ , and integrating the wealth effect, by distinguishing 
net financial wealth, FW, vs. gross housing wealth, HW, of households, the extended 
consumption function becomes 
 HWcFWcYccYccYccC HWFWnrwnrrwrw ++−+−++= ππ ππ )()(0  (Equation 3) 
Regarding the effects of distribution, we expect 0)()( <−<− wrwnr cccc ππ .  The 
overall effect of a change in the profit share on consumption will then depend on the share of 
the rentier income in the profits and the magnitudes of )( wnr cc −π and )( wr cc −π : 
π
π
π
π
π ππ
r
wr
nr
wnr cccc
C )()( −+−=∂
∂
     
(Equation 4) 
The expectation regarding wealth effects is that  0>> FWHW cc . We use gross housing 
wealth instead of housing wealth net of mortgages in order to better reflect the debt channel 
backed by rising house prices. However in order to capture the possible future contractionary 
effects of debt, we use net financial assets, i.e. financial wealth-liabilities. The liabilities 
include also the mortages. Bhaduri et al. (2006) argue that the wealth effect is based on 
notional wealth, which cannot be realised collectively but only serve as collateral for 
consumers to accumulate debt; and beyond a point the wealth effect may even turn negative 
due to increased interest payments, and increased risk of default. Because of high debt levels, 
the fragility of the economy to the possible shocks in the credit market increases, as is being 
observed now after the financial crisis. Financialization leads to a debt-led growth by fueling 
consumption in the short-run, but debt has to be serviced in the future. The debt channel is a 
redistribution of income from indebted low-income households to rentier households. Thus 
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the positive effects of the debt-led growth will also be partially offset by the negative effects 
of redistribution on consumption. Hein and van Treeck (2008), Dutt (2006), and Palley (1996) 
also point at this conflicting flow and stock effects of higher debt.    
In this paper we take the debt and wealth accumulation as exogenous; so our model 
involves the effects of future debt payments through exogenously changing income 
distribution and net financial wealth. In that respect our model is not a stock-flow consistent 
model. 
Another important aspect of financialization has been the increase in the share of 
managerial wages, or the share of the top 1% or even 0.1% among the wage earners. The data 
about the USA is well-documented by Piketty and Saez (2003). However these data exist only 
at annual frequency, and for econometrical reasons we prefer to use quarterly data, and 
thereby we are unable to include managerial wages in our estimations.  
2.2 Investment 
Keynesian as well as neoclassical investment functions depend on output, which is the 
standard accelerator effect, and some measure of the cost of capital (Chirinko 1993). 
Additionally in our basic Bhaduri-Marglin model investment is expected to increase when the 
profit share rises because this signals higher future profitability of investments. Moreover it is 
often argued that retained earnings are a privileged source of finance and may thus influence 
investment expenditures. So investment, I, in our basic Bhaduri-Marglin model is expressed 
as 
ππiYiiI YA ++=
        
(Equation 5) 
where Ai  is autonomous investment, Yi
 
is the accelerator effect, and πi  is the effect of 
profitability on investment, which is expected to be positive.  
Financialization brought about many changes that potentially affect physical 
investment by firms. One of the most important changes in investment behaviour is due to the 
increased role of shareholders in the firm (Boyer, 2000; Stockhammer, 2004, 2005-6). 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that a shift in management behaviour from ‘retain and 
reinvest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’ has occurred. Financial market-oriented remuneration 
schemes based on short-term profitability increase the orientation of management towards 
shareholders’ objectives.   
Regarding the effect of the finance-dominated regime on the financing behavior of the 
firms, a perverse effect has been observed. Firms have not used new financial instruments to 
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expand their investment expenditures. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the buyback of corporate 
shares has led to an overall negative contribution of the stock market to the financial position 
of non-financial businesses (Schaberg 1999). Non-financial firms seem to increasingly rely on 
internal finance for investment projects. Overall, non-financial businesses seem to move from 
a net debtor position to a neutral or net creditor position (OECD 2007).   
Consequently the relationship between profits and investment has changed. Not only 
in the USA, but also in the major economies (Germany, France and the UK), the investment–
profit ratio shows a clear declining trend, thus higher profits do not automatically lead to 
higher investment. For Keynesians, who argue that expectations rather than profits are the 
main driving force behind investments, this is not all that surprising. Kalecki even pointed out 
that the causation may be inverse: investment causing profits, rather than the other way 
around. Empirically, profits play a modest role in determining aggregate investment (e.g. Ford 
and Poret 1991; Stockhammer et al. 2007). 
In order to explain the puzzle of the decreasing ratio of investments to profits, we 
again disaggregate the profit share as rπ  and nrπ 4, and rewrite the investment function as 
follows:  
rrnrnrYA iiYiiI ππ ππ +++=
       
(Equation 6) 
Our hypothesis is that 0>nriπ
 
and 0<riπ . We suggest that the appropriate variable to 
capture the effect of profitability on investments is nrπ rather than π , since it reflects the 
available internal funds of the firm for investment more precisely. The expected negative 
effect of rπ indicates the significance of the shareholder value orientation in suppressing 
investment beyond its direct negative effect on the investable funds. In the absence of 
quantitative measures reflecting the manager-shareholder relation rπ  is the only variable 
reflecting share-holder value orientation. The negative effect of higher dividend or interest 
payments on investment is also incorporated in the theoretical Post-Keynesian models by 
Hein (2006, 2007, 2008a, b), Lavoie (1995, 2008), Lavoie and Godley (2001-2), van Treeck 
(2007), and Skott and Ryoo (2008).  
The overall effect of a change in the profit share on investment will then depend on the 
share of the rentier in the profits and the relative magnitudes of the effects of nriπ
 
and riπ : 
                                                 
4 We use gross private profits since private investments are also gross. 
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π
π
π
π
π ππ
r
r
nr
nr ii
I +=∂
∂
       
(Equation 7) 
The models by Skott and Ryoo (2008) and van Treeck (2007) also include the effects 
of the leverage ratio and Tobin’s q. Higher dividends and share buybacks increase firms’ 
dependence on debt as well as share prices and thereby Tobin’s q. The effect on investment 
depends on the relative magnitude of the negative leverage effect and lower availability of 
investable funds vs. the positive effect of a higher Tobin’s q.  We do not include the Tobin’s q 
for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Empirical evidence has failed to support q theory 
(Ford and Poret 1991, Chirinko 1993, Medlen 2003). Theoretically, it is unclear why an 
increase in Tobin’s q, which is primarily an outcome of share buybacks and increasing 
dividend payments in the 2000s would lead to rising investment (Hein, 2008b).. Furthermore 
the debt stock is also not included explicitly in our model; thus the effect of debt on 
investment is  incorporated through the exogenously changing interest payments.   
Furthermore as a consequence of the finance-dominated regime firms also face a 
higher degree of uncertainty, which may make physical investment projects less attractive 
(Stockhammer and Grafl, 2008). In particular volatility of exchange rates seems to have had 
some effects on manufacturing investment. However, uncertainty is hard to measure and 
estimation results from the existing literature are not conclusive enough to suggest a clear 
order of magnitude of the effect (Carruth et al. 2000). Thus our model will be limited in the 
sense that it will not reflect the effects of volatility and uncertainty on investment. 
2. 3 Total effects on aggregate demand  
The effect of a change in the profit share on total private demand will depend on the 
effects on consumption, investment, and net exports: 
ππ
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π ππππ ∂
∂+++−+−=∂
∂ NXiiccccY rrnrnrrwrnrwnr )()(
  
(Equation 8) 
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π∂
∂Y  is private excess demand, that is, the change in demand caused by a change in 
income distribution given a certain level of income.5 The sign of π∂
∂Y  is ambigous and 
depends on the relative magnitude of the effect of distribution on consumption, investment, 
and net exports, where 0)()( <−<− π
π
π
π
ππ
r
wr
nr
wnr cccc  and 0<π
π
π
r
ri , but 0>π
π
π
nr
nri  and 
0>∂
∂
π
NX . This is an empirical issue that has to be tested.  If the total effect is positive 
(∂Y/∂π>0), the demand regime is called profit-led, and if ∂Y/∂π<0, it is called wage-led. If the 
reaction of consumption to an increase in the profit share is strong due to high consumption 
differentials, and if the share holder value orientation effect on investment is high, compared 
to the positive effect of an increase in nrπ  on investment, and the positive effects of π  on net 
exports then demand will be wage-led. Thus if 
ππ
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
ππππ ∂
∂+>+−+− NXiicccc nrnrrrrwrnrwnr )()( , then the economy is wage-led.  
 Next we discuss the effect of a redistribution in favor of the rentier income and at the 
expense of non-rentier profits with a constant π , thus the case where nrr ππ Δ−=Δ =1%-
point. The effect on private excess demand will be: 
0)()( ++−−+−−=∂
∂
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π ππππ
r
r
nr
nr
r
wr
nr
wnr iicccc
Y
     
(Equation 9) 
0)()( ++−−+−−=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
∂
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π ππππ
π
r
r
nr
nr
r
wr
nr
wnr
r
iiccccY
 
The first term, ,)( π
π
π
nr
wnr cc −− is positive, but π
π
π
π
π
π
πππ
r
r
nr
nr
r
wr iicc ,,)( −− are all 
negative. If π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
ππππ
r
r
nr
nr
r
wr
nr
wnr iicccc +−−<−− )()( , then a pro-rentier redistribution 
                                                 
5 In order to find the total effect of a distributional change on Y, this total partial effect of π  on Y has to be 
multiplied by the multiplier, i.e. 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂−
Y
G
Y
NX
Y
I
Y
C1
1
. 
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of income at the expense of the non-rentier profits is decreasing private demand. Thus pro-
rentier redistribution is contractionary. If π
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
ππππ
r
r
nr
nr
r
wr
nr
wnr iicccc +−−>−− )()( , 
then a pro-rentier redistribution of income at the expense of the non-rentier profits is 
expansionary. The effect of such a redistribution on I is however unambiguously negative. 
The effect on consumption is positive, if π
π
π
π
ππ
r
wr
nr
wnr cccc )()( −>−− . Thus a pro-rentier 
redistribution of income at the expense of the non-rentier profits can be expansionary despite 
the negative effect on investment, if there is a positive effect on consumption, which is high 
enough to more than offset the negative effect on investment. This is different from the 
finance-led regime of Boyer (2000), where the positive effects on consumption further spills 
over the investment, and financialization also has a positive effect on accumulation . Our 
expansionary case is rather similar to the “intermediate” case in Hein (2008b) and van Treeck 
(2007), where the effect of financialization on the accumulation rate is negative although the 
effect on the rates of capacity utilisation and consumption is positive.6       
Finally we discuss the effects of a pro-rentier redistribution of income at the expense 
of wage income with a constant nrπ . Thus )1( ππ −Δ−=Δ r =1%-point. The effect on private 
excess domestic demand is π
π
π
π
ππ
r
r
r
wr icc +− )(  , and is unambiguously negative.  
 To get the overall effect of the finance-dominated regime on private excess demand, 
we have to consider the effects of increased rentiers income as well as the wealth effects on 
consumption:  
HWFW
r
r
nr
nr
r
wr
nr
wnr cc
NXiicccc ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+++−+− ππ
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
ππππ )()(
  
 
The positive wealth effects can enhance the possibility of an expansionary finance-
dominated regime with a rising profit share. Boyer’s (2000) notion of a finance-led 
accumulation regime implies that the overall expression is positive. Stockhammer’s (2008) 
notion of a finance dominated accumulation regime does not imply an a priori sign for the 
total expression, but claims that the partial effects are economically relevant (and thus the 
pattern of growth changes). Additionally the finance-dominated growth regime will be 
                                                 
6 Hein (2008c) and van Treeck (2007) identify contractive (‘normal’), intermediate, and expansive (‘puzzling’) 
cases, following Lavoie’s (1995) model of the effects of the interest rate on the capacity utilisation, profit, and 
accumulation. In the contractive case all these variables are negatively affected. In the ‘puzzling’ case all three 
variables are positively affected. 
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characterized by frequent financial crises. This aspect is only indirectly captured here, as we 
treat financial variables as exogenous. 
3. Empirical literature  
Research in the Kaleckian tradition has recently produced a number of contributions on the 
identification of the demand regime based on the basic Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) model. 
However, empirical work on the effects of financialization on the demand regime is rather 
limited, despite the increasing amount of theoretical work in the Post-Keynesian literature on 
financialization.  
The tests of the basic Bharduri-Marglin models can be grouped into two estimation 
strategies. The first group of papers tries to estimate the full model, that is, a goods market 
equilibrium relation and a distribution function. Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) estimate a 
structural VAR model consisting of the variables capital accumulation, capacity utilization, 
profit share, unemployment rate and labor productivity growth for the USA, UK and France. 
From the empirical investigation it is concluded that unemployment is determined by the 
goods market, and that the impact of income distribution on demand and employment is very 
weak and statistically insignificant. Onaran and Stockhammer (2005-6) employ a similar 
model for Turkey and Korea and find some indication for wage-led demand regimes in these 
countries. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) estimate a two equation VAR with a demand 
equation and a distribution equation for the USA economy using quarterly data and the 
cyclical component of the HP filter. The effects for individual components of demand are 
then decomposed from the aggregate results (rather than estimated as behavioural equations). 
They find that the USA has a profit-led demand regime. However the results by Barbosa-
Filho and Taylor (2006) suffer from several econometric problems due to autocorrelation 
problems, lag structure, and the specification, therefore they cannot be regarded as robust 
(Stockhammer and Stehrer, 2008). 
 The advantage of the systems approach is that the interaction between the variables can be 
incorporated. The disadvantage of the VAR is that it is difficult to identify the effects of 
individual variables.  
The second, larger group of papers analyses the goods market in isolation. Typically 
behavioral functions are estimated for consumption, investment and net exports. The first 
paper along these lines was Bowles and Boyer (1995), who find that France, Germany, and 
Japan are profit-led, and the UK and the USA are wage-led. However the results are 
problematic, since they do not pay attention to time series problems.  Naastepad and Storm 
(2007) for eight and Hein and Vogel (2008) for six OECD countries are more recent 
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examples.  All of them use annual data and look at long run effects. Naastepad and Storm 
(2007) find a profit-led regime in the USA and Japan, and a wage-led regime in the other 
countries. The profit-led effect is primarily due to a very strong investment effect; the effect 
of distribution on exports is negligible, and the effect on imports is completely ignored. Hein 
and Vogel (2008) find wage-led regimes in the USA, France, Germany, and the UK, and 
profit-led regime in Austria and Netherlands. However their findings about the profit-led 
regimes are due to very low or insignificant effects of the profit share on both investment and 
net exports. The estimations of net exports simply as a function of the profit share also leads 
to insignificant effects. Stockhammer et al. (2009) for the Euro area offer a more sophisticated 
treatment of international trade by estimating separate price equations and import and export 
equations. This allows us to trace the effects of changes in distribution through prices to 
exports and imports. They find a wage-led regime in the Euro area.  Stockhammer et al. 
(2007) find a wage-led regime for Germany. Ederer and Stockhammer (2007) and 
Stockhammer and Ederer (2008) find profit-led demand regimes in France and Austria. 
The literature discussed above does not include control variables for financialization 
effects. If financialization has affected consumption and investment behaviour, then the 
results summarized above will be biased. As financialization is most developed in the USA, 
this is where one would expect to find the difference. 
Empirical literature in terms of integrating the effects of financialization in the 
estimations of demand regimes is until now limited to four papers to the best of our 
knowledge. In an earlier work Hein and Ochsen (2003) estimate the effect of the interest rate 
within a post-Kaleckian growth model for several OECD countries for the period of 1960-
1995. Rather than actual interest payments (which are not readily available for most 
countries) they multiply the interest rate with the nominal capital stock and assume that this 
amount is distributed to the households. This proxy will differ from actual interest payments 
because not the entire capital stock is debt-financed and the interest rates on commercial 
credit typically differ from interest rates for government bonds. They do not include dividend 
payments in their model. Van Treeck (2008), Orhangazi (2008), and Stockhammer (2004) 
estimate only the effect of financialization on accumulation. Stockhammer (2004) uses 
rentiers income of non-financial business as a proxy for shareholder value orientation and 
finds that financialization may explain a substantial part of the slowdown in accumulation; 
but the results vary widely across countries. Van Treeck (2008) estimates the effect of the 
profit share and interest and dividend payments on private non-financial private investment in 
the USA for the period of 1965-2004 in ECM form, and finds that both variables of 
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financialization have a negative effect. However, the profit share itself is insignificant for the 
total estimation period of 1965-2004, and is only significant during the sub-period of 1982-
2004. However, as van Treeck is using annual data this sub-sample is too small to be reliable. 
Only in the estimation with the profit rate instead of the profit share is the profit effect 
significant. Orhangazi (2008) estimates the effect of financial payout ratios (interest 
payments, dividend payments, stock buybacks), financial profits, and debt on non-financial 
firms’ investment in the US for the period of 1973-2003 using firm level data and a dynamic 
specification in difference form; however he does not incorporate the long-run relations 
through an error-correction mechanism. He finds that all three measures of financialization 
have a negative effect on investments, although there are significant differences with regards 
to sector or firm size. 
In the following empirical part we address several caveats of the existing literature on 
the effect of finance-dominated regime on demand: we incorporate the financial and housing 
wealth effects on consumption. We disaggregate the effects of the profit share on investment 
into the effects of the rentier share and the non-rentier profit share. We discuss the overall 
effects on private demand in the open economy context, in order to make our results 
comparable to the former estimations of the basic open economy Bhaduri-Marglin model. 
Finally we address several econometric problems of the existing literature, using modern time 
series techniques.   
4. Empirical results  
The model will be estimated by means of separate single equations for consumption, 
investment, exports, and imports. Following standard practice in modern econometric 
modelling, we first checked the applicability of the error-correction models (ECM), and 
where there was no indication of cointegration, a general autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) 
model in difference form was used.   
The single equation approach fails to make use of the fact that consumption, 
investment and net exports (and state expenditures) add up to GDP. For both limitations a 
systems approach, like the VAR approach used by Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) and 
Onaran and Stockhammer (2005-6), may be a solution, which, however, becomes problematic 
when too many variables are integrated, and the results are more difficult to interpret.   
We are using quarterly data for the period of 1960:1-2007:4. Variable definitions can 
be found in the Appendix (Table A.1). For econometric reasons all variables enter the 
estimation in logarithmic form. Unit root tests suggest that all these variables are integrated of 
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order one I(1). Thus ECM or difference specifications are applicable. Simple autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) modelling with OLS was chosen as the main estimation strategy. We 
start from a general model including all the 8 lags of the variables, except for the 
contemporaneous values to avoid endogeneity problems, and gradually reduce the number of 
the lags by dropping the most insignificant lag and repeating the estimation until only 
significant variables remain. In all equations reported below Breusch—Godfrey test for 
autocorrelation cannot reject the null-hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation. 
4.1 Consumption  
We start with the general form of a standard Keynesian consumption function as in 
Equation 2. For the convenience of estimation and calculation we divide both sides by GDP, 
Y7, and reformulate the consumption function as  
ππ )(0 ww ccY
cc
Y
C −++=                                     (Equation 11) 
The ECM specification did not give statistically significant results as can be seen in 
the Appendix Table A.3. Table 1 reports the regression results for the ADL specification in 
difference form.8 In the basic difference specification (specification 1 in Table 1), the 
consumption elasticity for the profit share is -0.08.9 The hypothesis that consumption 
propensities vary between profit and wage income is confirmed. Since the estimation is in 
logarithmic differences, we have to convert the elasticity into marginal effect. At the sample 
mean the difference in the marginal propensity to consume out of wages and profits is 0.17.10 
A redistribution of 1%-point of GDP from wages to profits would thus induce 0.17 %-points 
less consumption expenditures as a ratio to GDP at the sample mean.   
TABLE 1 
                                                 
7 Both C and Y are nominal values. 
8 Since the function is estimated in difference form, the cw in the theoretical model is dropping. The constant, 
which has a small but positive and significant value, is controlling for a trend that is not captured by the other 
variables. Thus we can only estimate the differentials in the marginal propensity to consume, and not their levels. 
9 The elasticity is calculated as the summation of the coefficients of the explanatory variable divided by one 
minus the summation of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable. 
10 The conversion from the elasticity of consumption with respect to π , thus πCe , to the marginal effect on C 
for a given Y is as follows: 
R
CeYC Cππ =∂
∂ /
. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents the averages of the relevant 
ratios for various sub-periods. 
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Indeed the former estimations suffer from omitted variables due to the absence of the 
effects of the finance-dominated regime. Next we estimate the extended consumption function 
as in Equation 3. Again dividing both sides by Y, the equation to be estimated becomes 
Y
HWc
Y
FWccccc
Y
cc
Y
C
HWFWnrwnrrwrw ++−+−++= ππ ππ )()(0        (Equation 12) 
Table summarizes the basic specification (corresponding to eq. 2) and the extended 
one including financialization variables (based on eq. 12). After cointegration tests failed to 
indicate cointegration,11 distributed lag model in difference form was adopted. In the second 
specification we find a consumption elasticity of -0.06 for the non-rentier profit share and a 
much lower elasticity, -0.01, for the rentier share. Calculating the marginal effects, we find a 
differential in marginal propensity to consume between the wage and non-rentier profit 
income of 0.1612 and a differential in consumption propensity between the wage and the 
rentier income of 0.10 at the sample mean. Thus there is indeed a high consumption out of the 
rentier income. To make the results comparable with the basic specification, we take a 
weighted average of the two consumption differentials (as suggested in Equation 4), and find 
that the average difference in the marginal propensity to consume between the wage and total 
profit income is 0.14 at the sample mean, which is lower than in the basic specification, which 
ignores the relatively higher marginal propensity to consume out of rentier income. The 
calculation of marginal effects at the sample mean is in Table 2. We assume that the 
                                                 
11 The ECM specification again did not give statistically significant results as can be seen in the second 
specification in Appendix Table A.3. The t-ratio of the coefficient of adjustment, thus the coefficient of 
Y
CΔ  is 
-2.28, which is way below the critical ratio of 3.67 at the 10% level (see Banerjee et al., 1998). The Johansen test 
also unambiguously rejected cointegration.  In the case of our specification, where consumption is modeled as a 
ratio to GDP, this is not surprising. Despite the increasing trend in the consumption/GDP ratio in the USA since 
the mid 1980s, which supports the statistical finding of a unit root in the consumption share, the ECM 
specifications are very sensitive to the combination of variables. For e.g. Girouard (2001) tries to estimate an 
ECM specification for the USA with financial wealth, housing wealth, and the short-term interest rate in the long 
term relationship, and unemployment as an additional short-run control variable, the coefficients have the 
expected signs, but indeed the t-value of the ECM coefficient in two different specifications are -1.8 and -2.6 
respectively. Both are well below the critical values for a cointegration relation (see Banerjee et al., 1998). 
Moreover, this specification is very sensitive to the exclusion of the interest rate, or the unemployment rate. 
12 The conversion from the elasticity of consumption with respect to nrπ , thus nrCe π , to the marginal effect on 
C for a given Y is as follows: 
nr
C
nr R
CeYC
nrππ =∂
∂ /
, where nrR  is the  gross operating surplus –(net interest 
payments and dividends). Table 2 in the Appendix presents the averages of the relevant ratios for various sub-
periods. 
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elasticities for the whole period are constant.13 Converting elasticities into marginal effects 
will give different results according to where the partial effect is evaluated (see Table 2). 
The net financial and gross housing wealth have positive coefficients. Marginal 
propensity to consume out of net financial wealth is 0.007 and that out of gross housing 
wealth is 0.02. 14 Both are lower than in conventional estimations, but our estimations are in 
differences, and are not directly comparable to the ECM results of the previous studies, which 
concentrate on wealth effects, but ignore distributional effects.15 This is the first study to our 
knowledge that tests the effect of distribution on consumption and controls for the wealth 
effects. Multiplying the marginal effects with the actual changes in 
Y
FW
 and  Y
HW , we can 
find the actual effect of wealth on consumption. Taking the ratio of the actual effect to the 
actual change in 
Y
C  during the era of finance-dominated regime, 1980-2007, we can explain 
12.4% of the change in consumption by changes in housing wealth, and 5.5% by changes in 
financial wealth. 
Finally we compare our results for the effects on consumption with the literature, 
although the results are not readily comparable because of the differences in specification. 
Naastepad and Storm (2007) estimate a difference of 0.22 in the savings propensities between 
wages and aggregate profits; Hein and Vogel (2008) estimate a differential (in the 
consumption propensities) of 0.14; however both papers estimate only the basic Bhaduri-
Marglin model.   
4.2 Investment 
The investment function is first estimated in the basic form in Equation 5 in an ECM 
form. However this estimation is biased, since it does not take into consideration the effects of 
payments to the rentier. The most important result of this estimation is that investment is 
cointegrated with Y but not with the profit share. The results are in the Appendix in Table 
                                                 
13 The trials for various subperiods of post-1980s with few observations are not very reliable with 7 explanatory 
variables and 8 lags of each.  
14 The conversion from the elasticity of consumption with respect to 
Y
HW
, thus 
HWC
e , to the marginal effect on 
C for a given Y is as follows: 
HW
Ce
YHW
YC
HWC
=∂
∂
/
/
. Table 2 in the Appendix presents the averages of the 
relevant ratios for various sub-periods. 
15 E.g. OECD (2001) estimates that the marginal propensity to consume out of net financial wealth is 0.03 and 
that out of gross housing wealth is 0.05 during the period of 1970:1-1999:2 in the US. 
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A.4.16 This result is robust to the use of the level of real profits instead of the profit share. 
There is no long-run relation between the profit share and investment. That supports the 
puzzle that the ratio of investments to profits has been decreasing since the 1980s. Does 
financialization offer an explanation to that? To be more specific, once we disaggregate the 
profit share again as rπ , the rentier income share, and nrπ , the non-rentier profit share, as 
suggested in Equation 6 are investments indeed cointegrated with the non-rentier profit share?  
The estimation results are in specification in Table 3.  
Table 3 
The first specification in Table 3 shows the results when we include both the rentier 
and non-rentier income in the cointegrating relation, and leave both variables in the 
cointegration vector of the ECM specification although that they both have insignificant 
coefficients. Although the coefficients are statistically insignificant, economically they are 
indicative: This estimates an elasticity of 0.22 with respect to rnπ  and -0.14 with respect 
to rπ .17 The corresponding marginal effects are 0.15 and -0.29 for rnπ  and rπ respectively. 18 
The overall (weighted) maginal effect of a 1%-point increase in the profit share is then 
0.03%-point increase in I/Y calculated as in Equation 7.  
Next we estimated a restricted ECM model, where the long run effect of rπ  on 
investment is restricted to zero, and only short run effects are allowed. The results, which are 
reported in specification 2 of Table 3, show that there is a long-run cointegration relation 
between investment, GDP, and the non-rentier profit share. The long-run elasticity of 
investment with respect to the non-rentier profit share is 0.48. The short run effects of both rπ  
and  nrπ  are in the expected direction. Calculating the marginal effect at the sample average 
shows that a 1%-point increase in the non-rentier profit share leads to a 0.33%-point increase 
                                                 
16 When the equation is estimated in difference form,π  has a significant and positive effectwith a marginal 
effect of 0.11 on I/Y; however this estimation is biased since it ignores the cointegrating long run relation 
between I and Y. 
17 The elasticity is calculated as the coefficient of the level of the explanatory variable divided by the negation of 
the coefficient of the level of investment. 
18 The conversion from elasticities to partial effects on I/ Y is as follows: 
nr
I
nr R
IeYI
rππ =∂
∂ /
, where nrR  is 
gross operating surplus-(net interest payments + dividends). Table 2 in the Appendix presents the averages of the 
relevant ratios for various sub-periods. This is calculated by abstracting from the changes in the price deflators 
through time, thus 
nrR
I
 is the ratio of the nominal values. The marginal effect of rπ  is calculated in the same 
fashion. 
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in private real investment as a ratio to GDP at the sample mean.19 However since non-rentier 
profits are only 73.1% of the gross operating surplus, a 1%-point shift in income distribution 
in favour of capital, creates only 0.24%-point increase in investments as a ratio to GDP. 
Specification 1 estimates a much lower effect of rnπ  on investment compared to the results of 
specification 2, but specification 2 is also misspecified since it restricts the long run effect of 
rπ to zero. 
However, the restricted specification 2 in Table 3 is ignoring the long run negative 
effect of rπ on I. Alternatively, when we restrict the long-run effect of nrπ to be zero, we find 
that rπ  has a negative long run effect on investment (specification 3 in Table 3). In this 
specification the non-rentier profits, nrπ , have only a short-run positive effect, whereas the 
rentier income share has a positive short-run effect, which is counterintuitive. In this 
specification the long-run elasticity of investment with respect to the rentier income share is -
0.23, which corresponds to a marginal effect of -0.47 at the sample mean.  
Combining the long run marginal effect of  nrπ  (0.33%-point based on specification 2) 
and the long run marginal effect of rπ  (-0.47 based on specification 3), the effect of a rise in 
the gross profit share by 1%-point on investment/GDP is 0.12%-point (calculated as in 
Equation 7). The safe approach would be to say that the effect of a 1%-point increase on the 
profit share on I/Y lies between 0.03%-points and 0.12%-points. Multiplying the marginal 
effects with the actual change in the rentier and non-rentier profit shares, we can explain 29-
49% of the actual decline in investment/GDP.  
Table 4 summarizes the calculation of the marginal effects for  rπ  and  nrπ  and  
corresponding weigthed  marginal effect of the profit share on investment for the three 
different specifications. 
Table 4   
Demand is playing a key role in determining investment expenditures, again in 
accordance with the literature (Chirinko 1993, Ford and Poret 1992) The accelerator effects 
are well above one, i.e. the marginal effect of a 1% increase in GDP increases 
investment/GDP ratio by  1.3-1.4%-point in the long run.     
                                                 
19 Again the conversion from elasticities to partial effects on I/ Y is as follows: 
nr
I
nr R
IeYI
nrππ =∂
∂ /
, where nrR  
is the  gross operating surplus –(net interest payments and dividends). 
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The real interest rate is not included in the estimations since the effect of the interest 
payment on investable funds is captured by disaggregating profits as non-rentier and rentier 
profits. Another important function of the interest rate in mainstream investment functions is 
however to capture the effect of cost of capital relative to labor; our estimations does not 
capture this relative cost effect on investment. When we include the (ex post) real long-term 
interest rate in the ECM specification, it had a significant but positive long-run effect on 
investment, which is counterintuitive.  The marginal effects with a constant elasticity 
calculated at different period averages are discussed below in Section 4.3. We also checked 
whether the elasticities are changing for different sub-periods, but the results were 
insignifincant or implausible.20  
This overall low effect of the gross profit share on investment is in line with the 
literature on aggregate investment functions, which usually finds a lower profit elasticity of 
investment (Chirinko 1993), compared to firm-level investment functions, which usually find 
a larger effect of cash flow on investment (Fazzari and Mott 1986). Compared to the recent 
empirical work on the USA in the tradition of the Bhaduri-Marglin model, our specification 
that addresses financialization is an improvement. Hein and Vogel (2008) claim that the profit 
share has no effect on investments, but this is because they do not test the positive effect of 
the non-rentier profit share, but just aggregate profit. Interestingly Naastepad and Storm 
(2007) find a very strong elasticity of investment to profits (0.48) in the basic Bhaduri-
Marglin model, without disaggregating the rentier share; however their specification seems to 
be problematic by estimating the investment/GDP as a function of the profit share and real 
GDP in levels (in logs) without paying attention to the time series properties. The lower 
bound of our estimates on the weighted effect of the profit share on investment are consistent 
with the insignificant effect of the profit share on accumulation in the USA found by 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) based on systems equations; however our upper bound 
suggests the presence of significant effects, although they are not very high.  In a recent paper 
van Treeck (2008) estimates net non-financial private investment (normalized by the capital 
                                                 
20 Based on the estimations for different sub-periods of 1980-2007, 1981-2007, 1982-2007, 1983-2007, 
1984-2007, 1985-2007, and 1992-2007, we obtain a long-run elasticity for the non-rentier profit, which is 
ranging between 2.8 and 8.9 respectively. Moreover except for two periods (1981-2007, 1982-2007) GDP is not 
significant in the cointegrating relation, and therefore dropped. 1982-2007 is the only period where rentier-
income, non-rentier profits, and GDP are all significant, but then the t-value of the ECM coefficient lies below 
the critical value, indicating the absence of a cointegration relation. Due to the implausible values for the profit 
coefficient, the non-robustness of the cointegration relations, and most of all due to the insignificance of GDP in 
many sub-periods, we do not pursue different period estimations in our analysis. The addition of a trend or a 
dummy for post-1980s also did not improve the results. The dummy was insignificant and with the trend GDP 
was dropped out of the cointegration relation, which is also not plausible.  
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stock) in ECM form by using annual data for the USA as a function of the net profit share and 
capital productivity as in the traditional Bhaduri-Marglin model, but controlls for interest and 
dividend payments (both normalized by the capital stock). Since he also does not disaggregate 
the profit share as non-rentier profits, he also does not find a significant effect of the profit 
share for the total period of 1965-2004; he finds a positive effect only for the sub-period of 
1982-2004, which is however problematic due to the low degrees of freedom with annual 
data. Even with our quarterly data the estimations for sub-periods deliver quite implausible 
results for the magnitude of the effects as discussed above, and the existence of a 
cointegrating relation is extremely sensitive to minor changes in the period. He finds a 
positive effect of the profit rate, but this is overestimating the profit effect due to the existence 
of capital productivity in the same equation. In both periods the effect of the rentier income is 
however negative, which is consistent with our findings. Orhangazi (2008), who uses firm 
level data verifies the existence of positive effects of the profit rate on the rate of 
accumulation. He further supports the findings in the literature about the negative effects of 
financialization; however his specification does not test for the long-run relation between 
investment and profits or financialization.  
4.3 Net exports 
To estimate the effects of distribution on net exports we follow a stepwise approach as 
in Stockhammer et al. (2008) for the case of European economies, and estimate the import 
and export functions as currently used in most macroeconometric models, i.e. as functions of 
export and import prices. In a former step domestic prices and export prices are estimated as a 
function of nominal unit labor costs and import prices. The estimated effect of nominal unit 
labor costs on domestic prices also allows to calculate by how much an increase in real unit 
labor costs (of say one percent) will (on the average) raise domestic prices.21 This approach is 
novel in the USA context. 
Table 5 summarizes the estimation for the domestic price deflator as a function of the 
nominal ULC and import prices. Table 6 shows the estimation for export prices as a function 
of domestic prices and import prices. Both estimations were performed in difference form 
after ECM specifications proved unsuccessful. An increase of nominal unit labor costs by 1% 
increases domestic inflation by 0.21 and export prices by 0.31.   
TABLE 5, 6, 7, 8 
                                                 
21 We measure the real unit labor costs simply by the wage share, thus 1-the gross profit share (1-π).    
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Table 7 summarizes the results of the export function. The explanatory variables are 
export prices relative to import prices, and the the trading partners’ GDP, which is the real 
GDP of the OECD minus the GDP of US. Since no support for a cointegrating relation was 
found, the equation was estimated in difference form. The elasticity of exports with respect to 
relative prices is -0.16, however it is insignificant.In the import equation, the explanatory 
variables are export prices relative to import prices, and the real GDP of the USA. Although 
the ECM model was applicable in this single case, we choose to estimate the import equation 
in difference form in order to be consistent with the other equations. Table 8 reports the 
difference specification. The elasticity of imports with respect to relative prices is 0.56. 
Table 9 shows the calculation of the effects of an increase in the profit share on 
exports and imports at the sample average. The total effect (elasticity) of a change in profit 
share on exports includes the effect of real unit labor costs on nominal unit labor costs22, the 
effect of nominal unit labor costs on prices, the effect of prices on export prices, and the effect 
of export prices on exports. Then this value has to be transformed from an elasticity into a 
marginal effect.23 A similar procedure is followed for imports. Overall an increase in the 
profit share by 1%-point currently leads to an increase in exports by 0.005%-points of GDP 
and a decline in imports by 0.02 %-points of GDP. So the marginal effect of an increase in the 
profit share on net exports is 0.024%-points at the sample average. As the economy becomes 
more open, the net export effect is growing gradually up to 0.04%-points for 2002-07.  
TABLE 9 
Again comparing our results with the previous work of Hein and Vogel (2008) on the 
effects of distribution on net exports in the USA, who do not find any significant effect of the 
profit share on net exports based on a single equation estimation for net exports, we conclude 
that our stepwise approach is important, although the effects are rather low. Indeed Naastepad 
and Storm (2007), who only estimate the effects on imports, also find an export elasticity of  
0.16 with respect to the profit share. 
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 where ULCPxe is the effect of ULC on export prices, and xXPe ist 
he effect of export prices on exports. The final two terms are to convert the elasticity to marginal effect by using 
the average values for the total sample as well as sub-periods. The whole term is multiplied by -1, since the 
effect of an increase in the profit share is the inverse of the effect of an increase in the wage share (i.e. real unit 
labor costs). 
 23
4.4 Total effects 
Table 10 combines the partial effects presented above on consumption, investment, 
and the net exports as a consequence of a pro-capital redistribution. Here we also calculate 
different marginal effects for the mean values for each business cycle, i.e. for the subperiods 
1962-70, 1971-74, 1975-82, 1983-91, 1992-01, and 2002-2007.   
The results with the basic specification without disaggregrating the profit share would 
indicate a clearly wage-led economy due to the negative consumption effect (which can be 
seen in the first column of Table 10) and the lack of positive effects on investment. This latter 
is also the case e.g. in Hein and Vogel (2008). However as we show in this paper the strong 
wage-led finding is mostly because of the insignificant effect of the profit share on 
investment. The consumption differential is also estimated to be slightly higher in this 
specification compared to the specification with the effects of the finance-dominated regime. 
Overall our basic specification indicates that a 1%-point increase in the profit share leads to 
0.14%-point decline in total private excess demand as a ratio to GDP at the sample mean.  
Table 10 
According to the results of the extended specification, the economy is still wage-led at 
the sample mean, but the magnitude of the effect is more moderate now. Depending on the 
different estimation of the effects on investment, our estimations suggest that a 1%-point 
increase of the profit share (leads to a decrease of private domestic excess demand by 0.03 to 
0.11%-point of GDP at sample means. The major improvement compared to the basic 
specification is the presence of significant effects of the profit share on investment; however 
since the positive effects of the non-rentier profits are partly offset by the negative rentier 
share effect, the investment effect remains still modest compared to the negative consumption 
effect. The result is not very different for subperiods, but the domestic economy becomes 
slightly less wage-led during 1975-82, and the effect increases again gradually in line with the 
declining effect of profits on investment24, and the relatively stable marginal effect on 
consumption25. When the effects of foreign trade are also considered, the effect of a 1%-point 
increase in the profit share leads to a decline of total private excess demand by 0.004-0.088%-
                                                 
24 The marginal effect of non-rentier profits on investment peaks during 1975-82 to 0.36, and drops gradually 
afterwards down to 0.32 during 2002-2007. This pattern is parallel to the pattern of investment/non-rentier profit 
as well as the non-rentier profit/gross profits. The overall effect of an increase in profit share peaks during 1971-
75. 
25 Through time the difference between the marginal propensity to consume out of wages vs. non-rentier profits 
is increasing, whereas the difference etween the marginal propensity to consume out of wages vs. rentier income 
is decreasing gradually. So the opposite trends in the decreasing consumption differential due to a higher rentier 
income, and an increasing consumption differential due to a higher non-profit income are offsetting each other.  
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point of GDP at the sample mean. The lower bound of the estimate is however almost zero, 
indicating little effect of distribution on private excess demand. When the marginal effects are 
calculated for sub-periods, the effect of distribution on demand becomes less relevant as the 
economy becomes more open. The effect of an increase in the profit share lies between 
+0.01%-point and -0.08%-point at the mean of 1975-82, and between +0.006%-point and -
0.073%-point at the mean of 2002-07. So the lower bounds of the estimates indicate that the 
positive and negative effects of a pro-capital income distribution are by and large cancelling 
each other out. This is consistent with the findings in Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) based 
on VAR estimations. 
So far we have discussed the effects of a pro-capital redistribution on demand 
assuming an exogenously given share of rentier income within profits. Next we calculate the 
effects of a change in income distribution in favour of the rentier on consumption, investment, 
and thereby on domestic private demand as discussed in section 2.3: first we look at the 
effects of a 1%-point increase in the rentier income share, at the expense of the wage income, 
i.e. a constant share of non-rentier profit share, and a 1%-point decrease in the wage share. 
The effects of this scenario on consumption and investment are in Table 11a calculated for 
different sub-periods. The marginal effect on consumption at the sample mean is -0.10%-
point as a ratio to GDP and the marginal effect on investment ranges between -0.29 and -
0.47%-point of GDP, depending on the specification of the investment equation. The overall 
effect of a pro-rentier income distribution at the expense of the wage earners on total private 
domestic demand ranges between -0.39 and -0.57%-points at the sample mean. The total 
effect decreases subsequently though each period, and ranges between -0.31 and -0.44%-
points during 2002-07. The redistribution in favour of the rentier at the expense of the wage 
earners without a change in the non-rentier profits is more contractionary than an increase in 
the profit share led by both the rentier income and the non-rentier profits, since the positive 
effects on investment do not exist anymore.  
Second we simulate the effects of a redistribution from the non-rentier profits to 
rentier income; thus a 1%-point increase in the rentier income share and a 1%-point decline in 
the non-rentier profit share with a constant wage share. The results are in Table 11b. In this 
case the consumption effect is positive (apart from the sub-period 1962-1970), since the 
decline in non-rentier income stimulates consumption much more than the negative effect of a 
higher rentier income, due to the higher propensity to consume out of rentier income. At the 
sample mean the effect on consumption is an increase of 0.06%-point as a ratio to GDP. The 
effect increases gradually, and peaks during 1983-91, and decreases to 0.09%-points during 
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2002-07.  The investment effect is on the contrary highly negative, since both the decline in 
the non-rentier income and the increase in the rentier income depress investments. The total 
effect on investments is a decline of 0.44-0.80%-points at the sample mean. This negative 
effect is decreasing through time and ranging between -0.37 and -0.68 during 2002-07. 
Overall the total effect on private domestic excess demand at the sample mean ranges 
between -0.38 and -0.74. As of 2002-07 this total effect is lower within a range of -0.28 and -
0.59. The effects of a redistribution of profit income in favour of the rentier for a constant 
profit share creates the highest contraction effects due to very strong negative investment 
effects. 
Table 11 
Finally we multiply the marginal effects of the wealth as well as distribution effects 
with the actual change in the explanatory variables. The effect of housing wealth, which alone 
contributes to a 1%-point increase in consumption/GDP is particularly important in terms of 
the positive effects. The decline in the non-rentier profit share also led to a slight increase in 
consumption, and this and the positive wealth effects more than offset the negative effect of 
the increase in the rentier income share at the expense of the wage share, leading to an 
increase in consumption/GDP. Both the decline in the non-rentier profits, and the increase in 
the rentier share led to a decline in investment/GDP. The effect of pro-capital redistribution 
on net exports remained modest. We find that the changes in distribution and wealth effects 
during the finance-dominated era of 1980-2007 has led to a slight contraction in private 
excess demand by 0.6%-points of GDP or a minor expansion of 0.2%-points, depending on 
the specification of the investment effects. Thus it is fair to say that the positive and negative 
effects of the finance-dominated regime offset eachother, and the regime is not finance-led or 
expansionary, but also not strongly contractionary.   
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyses the effect of the finance-dominated growth regime on aggregate 
demand for the case of the USA economy based on an extended Post-Kaleckian macro model. 
We show that the incorporation of the effects of a finance-dominated regime to the Post-
Kaleckian macro models improves our understanding of the effects of distribution on growth. 
We discuss the effects of the changes in primary functional income distribution between wage 
and profit income as well as the secondary income distribution between the rentier income 
and the non-rentier profits on investment and consumption. We also incorporate the effects of 
the housing and financial market bubbles on consumption.  The primary redistribution of 
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income in favor of the rentier income as well as the non-rentier profits at the expense of 
wages suppresses consumption; however the secondary redistribution of profits in favour of 
the rentier income has a positive effect on consumption. The wealth effects of housing and 
financial market bubbles on consumption also lead to an increase in consumption as long as 
the bubble goes on and the debt mechanism is sustainable. A higher rentier income suppresses 
investment through both lower investable funds available to the firm and shareholder value 
orientation. But the increase in non-rentier profits has a positive effect on investment. 
However since the positive effects of the non-rentier profits are partly offset by the negative 
rentier share effect, the investment effect remains modest compared to the negative 
consumption effect. An accurate accounting of the effects of rentier income vs. non-rentier 
profits on investment is particularly an improvement compared with the estimations of the 
basic Bhaduri-Marglin model, which in our case indicates a clearly wage-led economy. 
However the strong wage-led finding is because of the insignificant effect of the profit share 
on investment. According to the results of the extended specifications, the USA economy is 
still wage-led at the sample mean, but the magnitude of the effect is more moderate now. The 
lower bound of the estimate is however almost zero, indicating little effect of distribution on 
private excess demand, and that the positive and negative effects of a pro-capital income 
distribution are cancelling each other out.   
We also made thought experiements on the effects of two possible mechanisms of 
redistribution in favour of the rentier: the redistribution in favour of the rentier at the expense 
of the wage earners without a change in the non-rentier profits is more contractionary than an 
increase in the profit share led by both the rentier income and the non-rentier profits, since the 
positive effects on investment do not exist anymore. The effects of a redistribution of profit 
income in favour of the rentier with a constant profit share creates the highest contraction 
effects due to very strong negative investment effects despite the positive consumption 
effects. 
The effect of housing and financial market bubbles on consumption is rather strong, in 
particular through the housing wealth effect. The decline in the non-rentier profit share also 
led to a slight increase in consumption, and this and the positive wealth effects more than 
offset the negative effect of the increase in the rentier income share at the expense of the wage 
share, leading to an increase in consumption/GDP.  Both the decline in the non-rentier profits, 
and the increase in the rentier share led to a decline in investment/GDP. This is analogous to 
the intermediate case in Hein (2008b) and van Treeck (2007). The effect of pro-capital 
redistribution on net exports remained modest. The positive effects on consumption and net 
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exports almost offset the negative effects on investment; thus the changes in functional 
income distribution and wealth effects during the finance-dominated era of 1980-2007 has 
had an overall a neutral effect on aggregate demand.  However, without the wealth effects, the 
overall effect on consumption, investment, as well as the aggregate economy would have 
been negative. 
As a consequence the macro economy is not finance-led while still being shaped by 
changes in the financial sector. The effects of financialization regarding income distribution at 
the expense of wage earners, the consequent reliance on debt fuelled by housing bubble to 
maintain consumption, and growth based on low physical investments has led to a risky and 
fragile economy. This is exactly the mechanism, which proved to be unsustainable after the 
financial crisis of 2007-09. The coming years will show the negative consequences of debt 
repayments and the bust of the housing bubble on consumption.  
Pro-capital as well as pro-rentier redistribution has created stagnant demand, and the 
effects of the asset market bubbles have offset these negative effects only through risky debt-
mechanism. The policy lesson for sustainable growth is to correct this imbalance in 
distribution, and avoid reliance on debt for consumption. Given that private demand is rather 
neutral with respect to distribution, or even slightly wage-led, there is room for correcting 
income distribution without affecting the growth potential of the economy.     
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Figure 1: Consumption/GDP  Figure 2: Gross Operating Surplus/GDP 
Figure 3: Gross Private Domestic Investment/ Figure 4: Net dividend & interest payments/
Gross Operating Surplus  Gross Operating Surplus 
Figure 5: Gross Operating Surplus‐div.‐ Figure 6: Gross Private Domestic Investment/
interest pay./GDP (Gross Operating Surplus‐div.‐interest pay.) 
Quaterly data from 1960:1 to 2007:4.
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Table 1: Regression results for consumption       
             
Equation:  1  2 
Dependent Variable:  Δ C/Y   Δ C/Y  
Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 
Variable  coefficient t‐stat.  coefficient  t‐stat. 
const  0.00 ** 2.11  0.00 ** 2.34 
Δ C/Yt‐1  ‐0.41 ** ‐4.74  ‐0.41 ** ‐4.96 
Δ C/Yt‐2  ‐0.21 ** ‐2.30  ‐0.17 ** ‐2.45 
Δ C/Yt‐8  0.14 *   1.66        
Δ πt‐1  ‐0.12 ** ‐3.02        
Δ πt‐4  ‐0.09 ** ‐2.31        
Δ πt‐5  0.09 ** 2.38        
Δ FW/Yt‐7       0.03 ** 2.97 
Δ HW/Yt‐2       0.06 *   1.81 
Δ πnr t‐1       ‐0.09 ** ‐3.36 
Δ πr t‐1       ‐0.08 ** ‐3.41 
Δ πr t‐2       0.06 ** 2.74 
Δ Yt‐1  ‐0.22 ** ‐3.15  ‐0.24 ** ‐3.94 
Δ Yt‐2  ‐0.16 ** ‐2.19        
Δ Yt‐3  0.09 *   1.78        
Δ Yt‐8  0.17 ** 2.73  0.12 ** 2.68 
Adj. R2  0.24       0.26      
DW  2.03       2.02      
 
 
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 2: The marginal effect of a 1%‐point change in the profit share on consumption/GDP, 1962:1‐2007:4 
         
Marginal Effect of 
π on Consumption    
(cπ‐cw)  
Marginal Effect of  
πnr on Consumption 
(cπnr‐cw)  
Marginal Effect of  
πr on Consumption   (cπr‐
cw) 
Weighted  
marginal effect of  
π on Consumption    
A  B  C  E   
‐0.165  ‐0.160  ‐0.101  ‐0.144   
Notes: Calculations in columns (A) is based on estimates from Table 1 Specification 1,    
(B) and (C) are based on coefficient‐estimatesestimates from Table 1 Equation 2.    
The relevant period averages in Appendix Table A.2 to convert elasticities to marginal effects.    
Column E is calculated based on column C & D as  in Equation 4: Bπnr/π+Cπr/π   
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Table 3: Regression Results for Investment             
                   
Equation:  1  2  3 
Dependent Variable:  Δ I  Δ I  Δ I 
Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 
Variable  coefficient t‐stat. coefficient  t‐stat.  coefficient  t‐stat. 
const  ‐1.11  ** ‐2.86  ‐0.81 **  ‐3.74  ‐1.20  **  ‐3.33 
It‐1  ‐0.21  ** ‐4.42  ‐0.20 **  ‐4.33  ‐0.19  **  ‐3.75 
GDPt‐1  0.29  ** ‐4.26  0.26 **  4.21  0.27  **  3.65 
πnr t‐1  0.04    0.62  0.10 **  2.00        
πr t‐1  ‐0.03    ‐0.93       ‐0.05  **  ‐2.06 
Δ It‐6  0.11  *   1.77  0.11 *   1.77        
Δ It‐8  0.23  ** 2.30  0.23 **  2.31  0.22  **  2.16 
Δ Yt‐1  1.07  ** 2.73  1.01 **  2.61  1.13  **  2.86 
Δ Yt‐2  1.11  ** 2.91  1.05 **  2.79  0.97  **  2.46 
Δ Yt‐4  0.75  *   1.82  0.67 *   1.67  0.98  **  2.46 
Δ Yt‐8  ‐1.48  ** ‐2.71  ‐1.53 **  ‐2.82  ‐1.33  **  ‐2.47 
Δ πnr t‐1  0.44  ** 2.52  0.44 **  2.54  0.55  **  3.00 
Δ πnr t‐4  0.44  ** 2.36  0.41 **  2.25  0.35  *   1.85 
Δ πnr t‐5  ‐0.64  ** ‐3.54  ‐0.67 **  ‐3.69  ‐0.61  **  ‐3.36 
Δ πr t‐1              0.26  *   1.78 
Δ πr t‐2              ‐0.25  *   ‐1.74 
Δ πr t‐4  0.29  *   1.91  0.26 *   1.73  0.35  **  2.40 
Δ πr t‐5  ‐0.34  ** ‐2.37  ‐0.37 **  ‐2.62  ‐0.31  **  ‐2.17 
Adj. R2  0.32       0.32      0.33      
DW  2.07        2.06       2.07       
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table 4: The marginal effect of a 1%‐point change in the profit share on investment, 1962:1‐2007:4 
  Marginal Effect (iπnr & iπr)       Weighted Marginal Effect     
   A  B  C  D  E  F 
πnr  0.150  0.330  ‐  0.110  0.242  ‐ 
πr  ‐0.290  ‐  ‐0.470  ‐0.078  ‐  ‐0.126 
iπnr(πnr/π)+iπr(πr/π)        0.032  0.115 
Notes: Column (A) is calculated based on the estimates from Table 3 Specification 1 as described in the text.      
Column (B) is calculated based on the estimates from Table 3 Specification 2.     
Column (C) is calculated based on the estimates from Table 3 Specification 3.     
The relevant period averages in Appendix Table A.2 to convert elasticities to marginal effects.      
Column (D), (E) and (F) calculated based on column (A), (B) and 
(C).        
The last line of Column D and E‐F are calculated as  in Equation 7: iπnr(πnr/π)+iπr(πr/π)     
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Table 5: Regression results for Price      Table 6: Regression results for Export Prices 
                 
Dependent Variable:  Δ P    Dependent Variable:  Δ PX 
Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4    Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 
Variable  coefficient t‐stat.    Variable  coefficient t‐stat. 
const  0.00  ** 2.76    const  0.00   1.23 
Δ ULCt‐1  0.05  ** 1.98    Δ ULCt‐1  0.25 ** 3.08 
Δ PM t‐1  0.04  ** 4.02    Δ ULCt‐3  ‐0.13 *  ‐1.66 
Δ PM t‐2  0.03  ** 2.74    Δ PM t‐1  0.14 ** 3.32 
Δ PM t‐3  0.03  ** 2.57    Δ PM t‐3  0.11 ** 3.05 
Δ PM t‐8  ‐0.04  ** ‐3.75    Δ PX t‐1  0.37 ** 4.49 
Δ Pt‐1  0.31  ** 4.71         
Δ Pt‐4  0.29  ** 4.81         
Δ Pt‐6  0.18  ** 3.21         
Adj. R2  0.86          Adj. R2  0.57      
DW  2.04          DW  2.05      
                 
                 
Table 7: Regression results for Exports      Table 8: Regression results for Imports   
                 
Dependent Variable:  Δ X    Dependent Variable:  Δ M 
Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4    Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 
Variable  coefficient t‐stat.    Variable  coefficient t‐stat. 
const  0.01  *   1.82    const  0.02 ** 3.54 
Δ YF t‐2  1.25  ** 2.56    Δ Yt‐1  1.90 ** 6.62 
Δ Y F t‐3  1.96  ** 3.67    Δ Yt‐2  0.50 *   1.66 
Δ YF t‐4  ‐1.21  ** ‐2.42    Δ Yt‐7  ‐0.49 *   ‐1.79 
Δ YF t‐6  ‐1.05  ** ‐2.17    Δ Yt‐8  ‐0.88 ** ‐3.06 
Δ PX/PM t‐3  ‐0.19    ‐1.22    Δ PX/PM t‐4  0.52 ** 3.48 
Δ Xt‐1  ‐0.34  ** ‐5.07    Δ PX/PM t‐5  0.30 *   1.90 
Δ Xt‐6  0.17  ** 2.45    Δ Mt‐1  ‐0.36 ** ‐4.76 
          Δ Mt‐2  ‐0.24 ** ‐3.39 
          Δ Mt‐7  0.14 ** 2.02 
Adj. R2  0.22          Adj. R2  0.33      
DW  2.00          DW  1.99      
 
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively
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Table 9: Calculation of marginal effects on net export for different time periods, 1962:1‐2007:4       
     
 
       
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 The effect of real unit labor cost on X 
1/RULC 
X/Y  
    The effect of real unit labor cost on M M/Y 
  
  A  B  C  D (A*B*C) E  F H (-A*B*C*E*F) 
Exports 1.27  0.19  ‐0.16  ‐0.04  1.47  0.08  0.005 
Imports 1.27  0.19  0.56  0.13  1.47  0.10  ‐0.020 
Sum                   0.024 
Notes: Values in columns (A), (B) and (C) are based on coefficient‐estimates in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8.       
 
ulcβ−1
1
ULCP x
e
xMP
e
xXP
e
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Table 10: The marginal effect of a 1%‐point change in the profit share on private demand for different time 
periods       
                   
   Marginal Effect of 
π on Consumption 
Weighted  
marginal effect of  
πr and πnr on 
Consumption 
Weighted  
marginal effect 
of  
π on 
Investment 
Private Domestic
 Demand 
Net Exports 
Effect 
Open Economy 
period  A  B  C  D  E (B+D)  F (B+C)  G  H (E+G)  I (F+G) 
                   
1962:2 ‐ 2007:4  ‐0.165  ‐0.144  0.032  0.115  ‐0.029  ‐0.112  0.024  ‐0.004  ‐0.088 
1962:2 ‐ 1970:4  ‐0.158  ‐0.136  0.035  0.118  ‐0.018  ‐0.101  0.012  ‐0.006  ‐0.089 
1971:1 ‐ 1974:4  ‐0.170  ‐0.146  0.040  0.135  ‐0.011  ‐0.106  0.016  0.005  ‐0.090 
1975:1 ‐ 1982:4  ‐0.165  ‐0.143  0.038  0.132  ‐0.011  ‐0.105  0.023  0.012  ‐0.082 
1983:1 ‐ 1991:4  ‐0.163  ‐0.141  0.035  0.120  ‐0.021  ‐0.105  0.025  0.004  ‐0.080 
1992:1 ‐ 2001:4  ‐0.168  ‐0.144  0.035  0.118  ‐0.027  ‐0.110  0.031  0.004  ‐0.079 
2002:1 ‐ 2007:4  ‐0.167  ‐0.144  0.033  0.112  ‐0.032  ‐0.111  0.038  0.006  ‐0.073 
Notes: The first entries in this table are as follows: Column (A) is Column (A) in Table 2. Column (B) is Column (E) in Table 2.       
Column (C) and (D) are the values in the third row in Columns (D) (Specification 1) and (E‐F) (Specification 2+3) in Table 4. Column (G) is  Column (H) in Table 9.  
The other  rows are calculated as marginal effects at the average values for different sub‐periods. The relevant period averages in Appendix Table A.2 to convert elasticities to 
marginal effects.  
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Table 11a: The effect of a 1%‐point increase in the rentier share and a 1%‐point decrease in the wage share
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Consumption
Total 
marginal effect of
π on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Investment
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Investment
period A B C (A+B) D (Specification 3) E (Specification 2) F (Specification 1)
Specification 2+3 
=D+E C+F
1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 0.00 ‐0.101 ‐0.10 ‐0.47 0.00 ‐0.29 ‐0.47 ‐0.39
1962:2 ‐ 1970:4 0.00 ‐0.143 ‐0.14 ‐0.67 0.00 ‐0.41 ‐0.67 ‐0.56
1971:1 ‐ 1974:4 0.00 ‐0.124 ‐0.12 ‐0.61 0.00 ‐0.38 ‐0.61 ‐0.50
1975:1 ‐ 1982:4 0.00 ‐0.100 ‐0.10 ‐0.51 0.00 ‐0.31 ‐0.51 ‐0.41
1983:1 ‐ 1991:4 0.00 ‐0.077 ‐0.08 ‐0.35 0.00 ‐0.22 ‐0.35 ‐0.29
1992:1 ‐ 2001:4 0.00 ‐0.088 ‐0.09 ‐0.38 0.00 ‐0.24 ‐0.38 ‐0.32
2002:1 ‐ 2007:4 0.00 ‐0.085 ‐0.09 ‐0.36 0.00 ‐0.22 ‐0.36 ‐0.31
Table 11b: The effect of a 1%‐point increase in the rentier share and a 1%‐point decrease in the non‐rentiers share
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Consumption
Total 
marginal effect of
π on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Investment
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Investment
period A B C (A+B) D (Specification 3) E (Specification 2) F (Specification 1)
Specification 2+3 
=D+E C+F
1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 0.16 ‐0.10 0.06 ‐0.47 ‐0.33 ‐0.44 ‐0.80 ‐0.38
1962:2 ‐ 1970:4 0.13 ‐0.14 ‐0.01 ‐0.67 ‐0.28 ‐0.54 ‐0.95 ‐0.55
1971:1 ‐ 1974:4 0.15 ‐0.12 0.03 ‐0.61 ‐0.34 ‐0.53 ‐0.95 ‐0.51
1975:1 ‐ 1982:4 0.16 ‐0.10 0.06 ‐0.51 ‐0.36 ‐0.48 ‐0.87 ‐0.42
1983:1 ‐ 1991:4 0.17 ‐0.08 0.10 ‐0.35 ‐0.35 ‐0.38 ‐0.71 ‐0.28
1992:1 ‐ 2001:4 0.17 ‐0.09 0.08 ‐0.38 ‐0.33 ‐0.39 ‐0.71 ‐0.31
2002:1 ‐ 2007:4 0.17 ‐0.09 0.09 ‐0.36 ‐0.32 ‐0.37 ‐0.68 ‐0.28
Notes: The first rows in these tables are as follows: Columns (A) and (B) are calculated based on the marginal effects in Table 2. Columns (D), (E), and (F) are calculated based on the marginal effects in Table 4.    
The other  rows are calculated as marginal effects at the average values for different sub‐periods. The relevant period averages in Appendix Table A.2 to convert elasticities to marginal effects. 
Total Effect of
π on Investment
Private Dome
Total Effect of
π on Investment
Private Dome
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Table A.1: Variable definitions
Notation Description source Computation
C Personal Consumption Expenditure, nominal USA National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) Tables*
C/Y Consumption Share USA NIPA Tables* Personal Consumption Expenditure, nominal/
GDP, nominal
I Gross Private Domestic Investment, real
deflated by Investment Price Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
Y GDP, real,
deflated by Gross Domestic Product Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
FW/Y Net Financial Wealth/GDP USA Federal Reserve - 
Flow of Funds Accounts**
(Financial Wealth - Financial Liabilities), nominal/
GDP, nominal 
HW/Y Housing Wealth/GDP USA Federal Reserve - 
Flow of Funds Accounts
Gross Housing Wealth, nominal/
GDP, nominal
π Gross Operating Surplus /GDP USA NIPA Tables
πnr Non-Rentiers Income Share USA NIPA Tables (Gross Operating Surplus - 
Net Dividends - Net interest and miscellaneous payments, domestic industry)/
GDP, domestic industry, nominal
πr Rentiers Income Share USA NIPA Tables (Net Dividends + Net interest and miscellaneous payments, domestic industry)/
GDP, nominal
P Price Index for Gross Domestic Product USA NIPA Tables
ULC Unit Labor Costs USA NIPA Tables Compensation of Employees, received, nominal/
GDP, real
PM Price Index Imports USA NIPA Tables
PX Price Inde Exports USA NIPA Tables
PX/PM Terms of Trade USA NIPA Tables Export Prices/Import Prices
M Imports of Goods and Services, real
deflated by Import Price Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
X Exports of Goods and Services, real
deflated by Export Price Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
YF GDP of OECD Countries (real) minus GDP of USA, 
real
OECD National Accounts***
Note: All Variables are in logarithmic form.  All variables are seasonally adjusted quarterly observations from 1960:1 to 2007:4.
* Source: http://www.bea.gov/National/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp
** Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm
*** Source: http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=7385629/cl=23/nw=1/rpsv/home.htm   
 42
 
Table A.2.: Period averages
Consumption 
expenditure/
Gross Operating Surplus
Consumption expenditure/
Non‐Rentier Profits
Consumption expenditure/
Rentier Profits
Non‐Rentier profit/
Gross Operating Surplus
Rentier income/
Gross Operating Surplus
period C/R C/Rnr C/Rr Rnr/R Rr/R
1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 2.02 2.78 7.97 0.73 0.27
1962:2 ‐ 1970:4 1.94 2.35 11.28 0.83 0.17
1971:1 ‐ 1974:4 2.08 2.65 9.73 0.79 0.21
1975:1 ‐ 1982:4 2.02 2.75 7.90 0.74 0.26
1983:1 ‐ 1991:4 2.01 3.01 6.03 0.67 0.33
1992:1 ‐ 2001:4 2.06 2.94 6.92 0.70 0.30
2002:1 ‐ 2007:4 2.05 2.96 6.70 0.69 0.31
Investment expenditure/
Rentier Profits
Compensation of 
Employees/GDP
Exports of Goods and Services/
GDP
Imports of Goods and 
Services/
Gross Domestic Product
Consumption expenditure/
HW
period I/Rr 1‐π X/Y M/Y C/HW
1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 2.00 0.68 0.08 0.10 0.57
1962:2 ‐ 1970:4 2.85 0.68 0.05 0.05 0.64
1971:1 ‐ 1974:4 2.62 0.70 0.07 0.07 0.63
1975:1 ‐ 1982:4 2.16 0.69 0.09 0.09 0.58
1983:1 ‐ 1991:4 1.50 0.67 0.08 0.10 0.53
1992:1 ‐ 2001:4 1.63 0.67 0.11 0.13 0.57
2002:1 ‐ 2007:4 1.52 0.66 0.10 0.16 0.46  
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Table A.3.: Regression Results for Consumption, ECM       
             
Dependent Variable:  Δ C/Y  Δ C/Y 
Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 
Variable  coefficient t‐stat.  coefficient  t‐stat. 
const  ‐0.02   ‐1.52  ‐0.07 **  ‐2.15 
C/Yt‐1  ‐0.01   ‐0.44  ‐0.07 **  ‐2.28 
FW/Yt‐1       0.01 *   1.71 
HW/Yt‐1       0.01   0.87 
πt‐1  ‐0.02   ‐1.51      
πnr t‐1       ‐0.03 **  ‐2.24 
πr t‐1       0.00   ‐0.36 
Δ C/Yt‐1  ‐0.43 ** ‐4.94  ‐0.43 **  ‐5.01 
Δ C/Yt‐2  ‐0.23 ** ‐2.50  ‐0.19 **  ‐2.61 
Δ Yt‐1  ‐0.22 ** ‐3.06  ‐0.39 **  ‐4.94 
Δ Yt‐2  ‐0.16 ** ‐2.17      
Δ Yt‐3       0.16 **  2.06 
Δ Yt‐4       ‐0.13 **  ‐2.08 
Δ Yt‐8  0.10 ** 2.13  0.11 **  2.13 
Δ FW/Yt‐2       ‐0.02 **  ‐2.01 
Δ FW/Yt‐7       0.03 **  2.34 
Δ HW/Yt‐1       ‐0.09 *   ‐1.82 
Δ HW/Yt‐2       0.09 **  2.36 
Δ HW/Yt‐3       0.07 *   1.72 
Δ πt‐1  ‐0.13 ** ‐3.32      
Δ πt‐5  0.10 ** 2.56      
Δ πnr t‐5       0.05 **  2.05 
Δ πr t‐1       ‐0.05 **  ‐2.45 
Δ πr t‐2       0.05 **  2.21 
Adj. R2  0.22       0.30      
DW  2.02       2.05      
 
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively.
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Table A.4.: Regression Results for Investment, ECM with 
π1 
       
Dependent Variable:  Δ I 
Estimation period:  1962:2 ‐ 2007:4 
Variable  coefficient t‐stat. 
const  ‐0.72 ** ‐3.14 
It‐1  ‐0.18 ** ‐4.51 
GDPt‐1  0.23 ** 4.36 
πt‐1  0.05   0.69 
Δ It‐6  0.11 *  1.77 
Δ It‐8  0.23 ** 2.28 
Δ Yt‐1  1.25 ** 3.38 
Δ Yt‐2  1.04 ** 2.88 
Δ Yt‐4  0.69 *  1.84 
Δ Yt‐8  ‐1.49 ** ‐2.72 
Δ πt‐1  0.65 ** 2.64 
Δ πt‐4  0.52 ** 2.04 
Δ πt‐5  ‐0.93 ** ‐3.81 
Adj. R2  0.31      
DW  2.05      
1. Since π is insignificant, it is dropped through  
the general ADLestimation process.     
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively 
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